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Two models are developed for calculating the availability
of the Harpoon Missile airborne command and launch system
(HACLS). The first model is a semir-Markov process. Its
assumptions are validated using the subsequently developed
computer simulation model, Both models are exercised with
parametric variations, the critical parameters being mean
time to failure, mean time to repair, and severity of the
operating environment. Less critical parameters are mainte-
nance efficiency and, for the simulation only, maintenance
time to repair probability distribution. A major discovery
in this paper is that the standard definition of availability
does not prove to be adequate when used to determine system
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Weapons availability and reliability studies are appear-
ing frequently of late, much of the interest being motivated
by the Air Force Project ABLE [1] which attempts to quantify
the effects of reliability, availability, and maintainability
(RAM), Project ABLE points out the need to improve RAM
of new systems and to provide RAM growth for existing ones
in order to reduce system life cycle costs (LCC), albeit at
increased initial aquisition costs [2] .
In order to more accurately determine LCC, a reasonable
effort to calculate weapon system reliability and avail-
ability is needed. For existing systems the calculation
depends chiefly on gathering maintenance data, available in
the Navy from its 3-M maintenance system data bank. For a
new system, however, lack of such operational data requires
that an analyst model the proposed system operation, make
certain assumptions, and base calculations on reasoned judg-
ment concerning projected system operation.
This paper outlines two models of Naval aircraft squadron
operations from which single subsystem availability is
determined for the Harpoon missile airborne command and launch
system (HACLS). HACLS is a system composed of four weapon
replaceable assemblies (WRAs), and various other components.
The WRAs are missile control panel (MCP), Harpoon data
processor (HDP), auxilliary armament interconnect unit (AAIU),
10

and Harpoon logic unit (HLU). HACLS has a built-in testing
feature (BIT) which affords the operator a functional check
of the system before and during a HACLS mission, while
creating the most severe operating environment for the system.
As with all avionic systems HACLS is subject to periodic
failures which render it unavailable for performing its
designed functions. The resultant availability determined by
the models is the probability that HACLS is operational on a
randomly selected aircraft at a randomly selected time, given
that the aircraft is functional. With suitable changes in
mean time to failure (MTTF) and other critical input param-
eters the models can be exercised to give an availability
figure for any aircraft subsystem,
The primary model, analytical in nature, is supported by
a digital computer simulation model. After these models have
been developed for the reader, parametric results are
presented and an application of the resultant availability
is shown
.
The concept of availability is explained and its
application to the models is shown. Although availability
is developed in the classical manner, some different perspec-
tives are developed. One of these is the notion of probabil-
ity that HACLS is up at the beginning of a scheduled operating
period. Others are operational availability and logistic
availability
,
Reliability data for the Harpon missile system, provided
by McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company-East (MDAC-E), is





To develop the concept of availability the following
stochastic process is defined, Let {W(t),t>0} denote a
performance process, such that
W(t) = 1 if the device is functioning at time, t,
= if the device is failed at time, t.





Let A(t) = Pr[W(t) = 1], and A(0) = 1, i,e, A(t) denotes
the probability that the device is functional at time t.
Note that E[W(t)] = A(t).
Define
A = lim A(t)
t+co
if the limit exists. Therefore, A could be considered the
probability that the device will function without regard to
when its performance is required, This limiting availability,
A, is in practice, most often called "the availability" but
.
a more precise term for it is asymptotic availability.
In developing the models described in this paper an
important variable is the proportion of time a device or
system is in an up, i.e. functional, state. This proportion
is derived as follows: if T (t) represents the total up
up y * *
time of the system by time t, then
rT = / W(s) ds.up J
The expected proportion of up time from time = to time = t
is then
rE[Tup (t)/t] = A(s) ds]/t,





Suppose A = lim A(t) exists. Then,
t-*°°
lim T (t)/t exists,
t-N. UP
and is equal to A,
Proof of the above is theorem is given in Appendix A.
It can be shown [3] that with exponential times to
failure (TTF) and exponential times to repair (TTR),
A(t)
" iMjU + X+i7U exP [ -< X + VuHl , t>0;
where
A = failure rate = MTTF
,
u = mean time to repair, MTTR.
Thus,
A = lim A(t) = T±fa ,
and, after simplification, the final form of A is
A = MTTF/ (MTTF + MTTR), (1)
B. USE OF AVAILABILITY THEORY IN THE MODELS
Equation 1 holds for more general cases than exponential
failure and repair times. In particular it holds when times




In the first of the following models HACLS availability
is defined as
A = Pr [HACLS is up at a randomly selected time],
This limiting probability is determined using a semi-Markov
process t
The second model, a computer simulation, calculates
availability in two ways;
(i) By using a mathematical expression equivalent to
equation 1,
(ii) The status of HACLS systems is sampled at random
times, thus creating a sequence of Bernoulli trials.
After an adequate number of trials are performed, the
number of successful trials is divided by the total
number of trials, the result being an unbiased estimate
of A, That is
A + = N /N. -, , (2a)est successes' trials' v '
or equivalently
,
A , = 1 - (N„ •-, /N+ . , ). (2b)est failures' trials
Equation 2a provides availability by the following argument:
Since for a Bernoulli random variable, W, with success
probability, p, E[W] = p; the quotient in equation 2a is an
unbiased point estimate of p. In an availability context p
would be replaced by A(t) since, by definition, W(t) of the
stochastic process {W(t),t>0} is a Bernoulli random variable
when sampled at time t. Also, a sufficient number of trials
is run, creating a limiting process which nullifies the
time dependence of A(t), thus giving the desired result, a
point estimate of A.
15

The expected range of availability values for HACLS is
0.95 - 0.999,,,. Therefore, an adequate number of simulated
trials, assuming normal sampling theory is computed as
follows
,
If A , is the point estimate of A determined by the
simulation, and a nominal value of 0,975 is used for A, a
lower confidence bound (LCB) may be computed. Recalling that
A . is an estimate of the Bernoulli parameter, A, the
est * ' '
applicable 90% LCB is A ~ e , where
e = Z
n qn [A(l-A)/n] » Zq qq being the 90 percentile
of the standard normal distribution, implying a 90% LCB.
Thus, with e = 0,005, and after solving the above equation
for the sample size, n,
n = (Z
^
90 / e )
2
A (l ~ A )
= (1, 2815/0, 005) 2 (0,975)(0,025) = 1601,
Therefore, the number of simulation runs is 1601. For the
remainder of this discussion "A" will be used to denote both




III. FRAMEWORK OF SQUADRON OPERATIONS
Figure 2 shows the daily scenario of operations for a
P-3 squadron, Time spent in each of the HACLS operating
modes is shown for each aircraft. HACLS is checked for
proper operation on both of the alert aircraft and on any
aircraft that flies a Harpoon mission. These checks consist
of a ground operating check, during which BIT is exercised,
plus ground operation for the remaining preflight period.
Should an aircraft fly with Harpoon, BIT is used one
additional time prior to the missile launchings. All except
two hours of the remaining flight time is spent in in-flight
standby mode of HACLS operation. Note that when a HACLS
flight is parametrically inserted into daily operations, a
total of three preflight checks occur on that day. Moreover,
the aircraft flying mission 3 has eight hours of HACLS
inflight operation.
Figure 3 depicts the HACLS transition trees, It shows
the transit from the three states: OK (HACLS up),
F (undetected failure), and F, (detected failure-in repair)
to those same states on a subsequent day. Primes indicate
transitional states.
Considering that HACLS starts OK, and functions reliably,
it transits to OK. If however it fails, it can go into F
,
,
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the system is again OK. If, however, maintenance action
is completed but due to poor workmanship, the system is not
in fact repaired, it transits to F . On the other hand, iff > u »
maintenance is not completed by the beginning of the present
day, HACLS remains F , , Finally, if HACLS is not pref light
checked, the system remains F , The remaining trees of
figure 3 show the transits from F and F , to the possible& u d *
states of the present day.
In terms of Markovian theory, the transitions depicted
form a positive recurrent, aperiodic, and irreducible Markov
process, i.e. it is irreducible ergodic. This property
becomes cruicial in the development of the following
analytical model. Note that the difference between F andJ u




A model developed by MDAC-E determines the availability
of the Harpoon shipboard command and launch system (HSCLS)[4j.
The system, as envisioned, is to be checked daily for proper
operation, and furthermore, it may be subjected to use on an
alert mission. This model is developed in a straight-forward
way since the time of shipboard daily operational system test
periods is somewhat predictable. In developing a model for
an aircraft squadron, the problem changes, since there are
nine or more aircraft, whose HACLS are checked infrequently
and in a non-deterministic fashion. Therefore, the following
model is developed.
This section describes an analytical model of the
operations of three types of Navy aircraft squadrons. The
objective of the model is to determine the availability of
the Harpoon missile airborne command and launch system (HACLS).
This model gives availability of the HACLS subsystem given
that its parent system, i.e. the aircraft, is functioning
properly. Availability in this context is defined as the
probability that the HACLS is in functional condition at a
randomly selected point in time,
A. ASSUMPTIONS
As formulated this model is responsive to:
1) HACLS Reliability (R). In accordance with accepted
reliability theory it is assumed that the exponential
21

distribution adequately describes the time to failure
of most avionic systems. Furthermore, the exponential
distribution readily lends itself to analytical modelling
Therefore, reliability would be of the form,
R = Pr[T. > t.] = exp(-k. A T t.), t.>0.1 1 ^ v 1 L 1 ' ' 1—
The random variable T., HACLS time to fail when in
operating mode i, is assumed to be exponential and the
system failure rate is k. L , In general a failure rate
may be a function of time, i,e. A = A(t), This dependence
on time gives rise to decreasing failure rate (DFR)
distributions, increasing failure rate (IFR) distributions,




failure rate is assumed to a constant equal to 0.0011
[failures per hour] over all HACLS modes of operation,
but the multiplier k. varies according to the severity of
the operational environment. The vector of environmental
k-f actors is shown as Table I
,
A high k-factor indicates a more severe mode of operation
and vice versa, A scalar k-factor, k , based on a
' avg'
time - weighted average of the k. 's, is used for the
analytical model. In order to apply this k one mustJ ^ J avg
assume that there exists no shock effect when HACLS goes
from one operating mode to another. An additional assump-
tion is that the derating effects of one mode of operation
do not interact with those of another. The calculation of
k is included in Appendix B.
avg ^
2) Maintenance Time to Repair (U). Although times to
failure of avionic systems are generally assumed to be
exponential, there exists some controversy over the distri-
bution of U. It is popular among reliability analysts to
assume that U has a log-normal distribution. However, a
log-normal distribution presents mathematical difficulties,
causing the resulting model to become analytically
intractable. Moreover, as Thompson points out in [5] , very
often samples from log-normal and exponential distributions
are indistinguishable. Finally, if in fact the distribution
of U is log-normal, the assumption of an exponential U with
a constant MTTR , u , would yield a valid point estimate of
availability by the following argument. It is clear from
equation 1 that asymptotic availability depends not on
the distributions of TTF and TTR, but on their means.
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restrictions, asymptotic availability, A, would be equal
for the exponential TTF--exponential TTR and the exponen-
tial log-normal cases. Thus, in the analytical model
U is assumed to be exponentially distributed with a mean
time to repair, ji, equal to 24 hours,
3) Maintenance Efficiency (a), a is defined as the
probability that HACLS is in fact repaired, given that
repair action on the faulty WRA is completed. Equation 1
may be modified to account for maintenance efficiency;
A = MTTF / [MTTF + (MTTR/a)], (3)
It is evident from equation 3, that as a increases, the
asymptotic availability increases, an intuitively appealing
result. The expected range of values for a is 0,80-0.95.
To provide a worst-case analysis an a of 0.80 is chosen.
4) The HACLS operating scheme: i.e. the length of HACLS
idle periods and operating period length. The operating
periods are two hours or eight hours long for preflight
checks and Harpoon flights, respectively. By specifying
the number and frequency a probability mass function for
length of operating periods may be deduced. The density
function for idle period length may be determined through
computer simulation t
The main question addressed by this paper is: How do
parametric variations in length of idle and/or operating
periods affect availability? The model developed to answer
this question is a semi-Markov process, that is an alternating
renewal process containing an imbedded Markov chain.
An example motivated by Cox and Miller [6] follows.
Suppose a piece of equipment can be in one of two
states, 1 if it is up and if it is down and in repair.
It is assumed that the equipment is constantly monitored
and that as soon as it fails it goes into repair (state 0).
Figure 4 depicts a semi-Markov process representing the



















The associated transition matrices, one for the X

























Then for X. to X. ±1 ,l l+l
S = QR =
q 1 i\1 +(l-q i )(l-r ) q.Cl-r, )+(l-q 1 )r1











The model described in this paper considers one aircraft
and tracks its HACLS status through time. The HACLS
installed aboard that aircraft may be in any one of three
states: 1, the functional state, 2. the failed state, and
3. the system-under-repair state, Furthermore, the system
may be functioning or it may be idle, with some probability,
at a given point in time, The functioning or operating
periods are fixed both for preflight checks of HACLS and
for Harpoon carrying missions, HACLS idle periods within the
daily operations are distributed exponentially.
Figure 5 depicts the alternating renewal process used
to model the status of HACLS,















The distinction between state 2 and state 3 is as
follows: HACLS is subject to unobserved and observed
failures, For the sample replication shown in Figure 5, if
the system fails during an idle period, the system goes from
state 1 to state 2 (undetected failure), but if the system
fails during an operating period, it goes from state 1 to
state 3, since the failure is immediately detected. Further,
if the system were in state 2, it could transit to state 3
(when the system is exercised, and the failure discovered)
and subsequently from state 3 to state 1,
To find availability, let P.(t) be the probability that











define the state variables,
X. = state at start of i operating period, and
Y. = state at start of i idle period:
= 1 if HACLS is up;
= 2 if HACLS is down;
= 3 if HACLS is in repair.




If X. = 1,
1 '
Y. = 1 if HACLS is up at the end of 0.;i l
'
= 2 with probability zero;
= 3 if in repair at the end of 0.
.
f X. = 2 or X. = 3,
Y. = 1 if HACLS is up at the end of •
l r i
'
= 2 with probability zero;
= 3 if in repair at the end of 0.
.
A description of the transitions from Y. to X.
., follows
i l+l
If Y. = 1.
X.,., = 1 if HACLS remains up through I .;l+l i '
= 2 if it fails in I.;
l
'
= 3 with probability zero,
Y. = 2 with probability zero.
If Y. = 3,
l
X...) = 1 if repair is successfully completed in I. and




(i) repair is unsuccessfully completed in I., or
(ii) repair is successfully completed in I
.
, but
HACLS fails again before the end of I.;b l
'









If X. = 1,
xi+1 = 1 if,
(i) HACLS stays up through 0. and I., or
(ii) HACLS fails in 0., and is successfully
repaired before the end of I
.
;
= 2 if HACLS stays up through 0., and fails in I
.
;
= 3 if HACLS fails in 0. and repair is not complete
by the end of I .
.
If X. = 2,l '
X.i = 1 if HACLS is repaired by the end of I . ;
= 2 with probability zero;





X. _. = 1 if HACLS is repaired by the end of I.
;
= 2 if HACLS is not successfully repaired by the end
of I. ;i
= 3 if repair action is not complete by the end of I
.
Define the transition matrices P., PR , and P as follows:
P, depicts the transition probabilities for X. to Y.,
A * * ii'
P depicts the transition probabilities for Y. to X. 1
t> 11+1
and P = P
A
PR depicts the transition from X. to X.,-. The
30

development of the entries of P., PR? and P is included as
Appendix C.
Letting A = k X T ;
,
avg L'
0(s) and I(s) be the Laplace transforms of operating and




+ v£k 0iX+1/v) '





^^ [1(A) - I(l/y)] ,


















(l-b)T(A)+bc (1-b) [l-I(X)]+bd bl(l/y)
(l-b)I(A)+bc (l-b)[l-I(A)]+bd bl(l/u)
Since the Markov chain at points X. is irreducible
1
ergodic, there exists a solution to the following equation
"
"(PAPB>'
The elements of the vector, tt
,
are as follows,
tt = Pr [OK at the start of operating period];
71"^ = Pr[F at the start of operating period];
iTo = Pr [F , at the start of operating period].






and tt although readily calculable, can
each be taken to be approximately equal to (1-tt )/2,
To compute P.. note that
tt. = the (long-run) proportion of transitions which
are into state j , and define
w. = the expected time spent in state j per transition.
32

Ross [7] develops an equation which yields P.. , the
desired limiting probability,
pi "iV £ Vj'3=1
Rigorous development of the w.'s is beyond the scope of this
paper, but if one assumes that w. = 71. E[0. + I.], for
3 3 i i
j=l, 2, 3, a vector, w, may be calculated. For example
with E[0.] = 2 hours (no HACLS flights) and E[I.] = 90
hours, E[0. + I.] = 92 hours. With
' l l
•ft' = (0,949, 0,02505, 0.02505), which gives
w v = (87,308, 2,346, 2.346), the resultant P- is 0.998
33

V, COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL
The computer simulation model is written in the GASP IV
programming language [8] . It is a Monte Carlo simulation of
a Naval P-3 aircraft squadron on an overseas deployment,
engaged in peacetime operations. At randomly selected times
of day, 1601 successive Harpoon alert flights are "launched"
and the number of successful launches is divided by the
number of attempted launches. The resulting quotient yields
the availability, A.
The following is a description of simulated P-3 squadron
operations, but suitable programming changes can be made to
allow the user to apply it to S-3A or A-6 squadrons, as well.
Availabilities discussed in this paper for the latter two
squadrons are determined from the foregoing analytical model,
however.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
1) This model assigns aircraft by identification number
(1-9) to the various missions outlined in figure 2. All of
these aircraft/mission assignments are shuffled at the
completion of each simulated day, with the exception that
one of the aircraft in the non-flying, grounded status
remains so for one simulated week to satisfy a real-world
aircraft (not HACLS) maintenance constraint.
2) The simulation causes alerts to be scheduled as
follows: one per day at a random time between t =
and t = 24 hours. The strike force consists of the
ready-alert 1 and 2 aircraft, and either the operational
aircraft 1 or 2 depending on which one is not flying at
the time of the alert.
34

3) Should the alert be scheduled during the first hour
of the day, the aircraft from the respective missions of
the previous day are assigned to the strike force.
4) One test bench is available for the repair of HACLS
failed components. If the test bench is occupied, failed
WRAs go into a maintenance queue.
5) Replacement spares are unavailable, and thus each
failed WRA goes into an under - repair state as soon as
failure is discovered.
6) GASP provides a set of parametrically controlled
random variate generators giving the user a choice
concerning the maintenance completion time probability
distribution. For this simulation the maintenance
completion time function is parametrically varied from an
exponential to log-normal probability density, each with
an arbitrary mean of 24 hours and standard deviation of
4 hours, since no empirical maintenance information yet
exists on HACLS at the time of this writing.
7) As in the analytical model, time to failure, TTF , is
assumed to be exponential, a distribution characterized
by a constant failure rate for all values of time. The
simulation program could be modified to provide for wear-in
decreasing failure rate (DFR), or wear-out, increasing
failure rate (IFR), of HACLS, However, that modification
is not made because it is unclear whether the system would
consistently exhibit wear-in or wear-out throughout its
lifetime, since the true distribution is probably of the
increasing failure rate average (IFRA) class. The IFRA
character is implied since HACLS is composed of elements
which themselves probably have exponential TTFs [3]
.
An IFR distribution would imply wear-out, only. Thus, the
no-wear exponential is used in order to avoid making a
significant error in TTF determination.
B. CONCEPT OF GASP IV
References 8 and 9 provide examples of simulations and
a full explanation of the GASP IV simulation language. The
GASP language provides the user a tool with which he may
model discrete, continuous, or discrete - continuous processes.
Since the HACLS availability model is perceived to be discrete,
35

that mode of GASP is employed. A functional flowchart of
GASP is shown as figure 6.
Figure 6 describes the logic flow of the GASP IV
computer simulation language as it applies to a discrete
event, variable time increment model, The user-supplied MAIN
program contains a FORTRAN command, "CALL GASP," which it
executes after each parametric change in the value of
maintenance efficiency, a, is made, After GASP is called
for each of the three values of a run, the following chain
of events is set into motion;
1) Input cards are read, GASP initializes files and
GASP variable arrays,
2) GASP calls subroutine INTLC to intialize non-GASP
variables
.
3) The simulation begins and GASP advances the clock to
the time of the next event and generates the event code,
IX,
4) GASP calls subroutine EVNTS(IX) and a computed GO TO
statement calls the user-supplied subroutine corresponding
to the event of code, IX.
5) GASP continues to advance the clock and schedule
events as above, checking to determine if the stopping
variable, MSTOP, has been set to a negative value. The
program sets MSTOP equal to -1, after the desired number
of replications, causing GASP to stop the simulation and
print out the results of the run.
C, MODEL DESCRIPTION
The following is a description of this GASP IV simulation
model. As before, the model utilizes an exponential reli-
ability function , R
.





































Again the k-factors used are listed in Table I, Time, t. .,
is determined from the matrix shown in Table II. This T
matrix represents the time during a simulated day that
an individual aircraft, i(i=l , . .
.
, 9) , spends in operating
mode, j ( j = l , . , . , 6) . Also, there are assumed to be no start-
up shocks when HACLS goes from one operating mode to another.
Finally, as before, the derating effects of one mode do not
interact with those of a mode entered subsequently.
The model is run with daily rotation, weekly rotation,
end of HACLS maintenance, and alert launch events. Figures 7
and 8 show the logic flow of the simulation. All aircraft
start with UP HACLS, An initial DAILY event (IX=1) is forced
in order to start the simulation. Subroutine STATUS is
then called from subroutine DAILY to check for failures on
each aircraft during the preceeding 24 hour operating period.
If the HACLS has failed on an aircraft and its failure is
discovered, subroutine MAINT( INDEX) , where INDEX = aircraft
side number, is called and an end of maintenance (subroutine
EMAINT) event is scheduled. Moreover, if the failure occurred
on an alert aircraft, subroutine REPLAC is called and another
aircraft (HACLS UP) is substituted for it. After all aircraft
have been checked for failures, the aircraft assignments of
the new day are finalized. Upon return to subroutine DAILY,
an alert launch is scheduled. On the basis of ZHOUR, the
time of alert launch, a check of HACLS status (HSTAT) is
made and the availability calculation is initiated. The













1 (ALERT 1) 22 1, 98 0, 02
2 (ALERT 2) 22 1, 98 0, 02
3 (OPERATIONAL 1) 14 10
4 (OPERATIONAL 2) 14 10
5 (TRAINING A) 21 3
6 (TRAINING B) 21 3
7 (TRAINING C) 20 4
8 (NON-FLY 1) 24
9 (NON-FLY 2) 24
T MATRI X
Entries are the number of hours, by mission category, that
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if a WRA is in main-
tenance queue a typs























© Coll Subroutine STATUSto final ize otrcraf tmission assignments onthe basis of HA C LS
status as determined
by Reliability
HSTAT(-) f\ implies HACLS OK
HSTAT(-)°2 implies HACLS Fy
HSTAT()»3 implies HACLS Fd
INDEX" ID number of aircraft
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if a WRA is in main-


















to fino I ize orrcraf t
mission ossignments on
the basis of HA C LS
status os determined
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or equal to 12 hours or launch time greater than 12 hours.
Then a Monte Carlo check compares a random number against the
reliability function value,
R = exp(-k At..), t. .>0.1 3 1j 1J lj—
The t^.'s come from either Table III, if launch time <_ 12
hours or Table IV, if launch time > 12 hours after the start
of the simulated day. No updating of HSTAT is done, since
this is a pseudo-launch, used only to determine the value of
the Bernoulli performance variable, Two counter variables
are introduced, one (NALERT) to count the number of alert
launch replications, and the other (NOK) to count the number
of successful alert launches.
"Successful" is defined in two different ways: (i) The
two alert aircraft are launched, and one non-alert aircraft
is launched; if the HACLS belonging to all three aircraft
are up, the launch is considered successful (refer to figure




is based on the availability of three aircraft it should be
3
approximately equal to A as shown in Chapter VII. (ii) The
HACLS status (HSTAT) of each of the squadron's aircraft is
determined and a tally of UP HACLS, by aircraft, is kept
for the 1601 replications. The resulting number of successes
is divided by the number of trials for each aircraft, and
















HACLS MODE INDEX12 3 4
10 1, 98 0, 02









Entries are the number of hours by mission category that



























Entries are the number of hours by mission category that
HACLS is in the various operating modes.
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Figure 8A shows this alternative calculation of
availabilities, A., i=l,,.,,9, and averaging to get
A = (1/n) £ A
i=l ±
In the simulation runs both A and A are calculated. A
est est
may be considered an operational availability in the sense
that it represents the launch success probability as seen by
an operational commander. A
r
on the other hand, represents
a logistic availability since it is based upon sampling
HACLS status of all aircraft assigned to the squadron, and
not just the ones which would be tasked to fly the strike
missions. The following asymptotic availability is
computed
:
A = 1 - (Down Time) /(Total Time). (4)
By probability theory, equation 4 is mathematically
equivalent to the standard definition of asymptotic
availability (equation 1). However, since the simulation is
responsive to maintenance efficiency, a (a < 1.0), the
resultant value of A should correspond to that calculated
using equation 3. This availability calculation is made in
order to verify the other availability computations
described above.
To parametrically insert HACLS flights into the daily
operation scheme, an indicator variable, IHAC3 (not shown in
the flow charts), is set to 1 for a day with a HACLS flight
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or for a day without a HACLS flight, On days with a HACLS
flight the aircraft assigned to mission number 3 files the
Harpoon mission. Therefore, R„ is modified to reflect the
more severe HACLS operating environment, as follows:
R
3
= exp(-k. AL t3j ), j=li * . • ,6;






3 (OPERATIONAL 1) 12 1,98 0.02 5,98 0.02
T3 VECTOR
After approximately 1601 replications the run is termi-
nated and the results are printed out. These results include
values of availability calculated using equation 2a with the
counter variables NOK, NOKl('), and NALERT; availability from
equation 4, and A. The actual computations of the avail-
abilities take place at points where no HACLS are in a failed
state. Therefore, if at 1601 replications there exist any
failed HACLS, the simulation run is continued until they
have been repaired. Additional runs with parametric varia-




An earlier version of this model is in published form
as [10] . Changes incorporated in the present model include
a random aircraft/mission rotation scheme having replaced a
deterministic one, and the parametric incorporation of
missile - carrying training flights in the simulation.
Additionally, in order to verify the response of the computer
model and to validate some assumptions of the analytical
model, parametric runs varying maintenance time (U)
distribution type and mean time to repair, u, are made.
Additions to the simulation in support of the analytical
model include: i) More than one method of availability
computation is employed and ii) A temporary program change
is used to empirically determine the distribution of idle
time periods.
In addition to the above support, sensitivity analyses
performed using the simulation model are bases for some
assumptions of the analytical model. Therefore, the GASP IV
model provides a basis for verifying the Markov chain, alter-
nating renewal process model and for validating some of its
assumptions, Furthermore, because sampling in the present
model occurs at points in simulated time at which no HACLS
are failed, a previously programmed "steady-state" check has
been eliminated.
D, DISCUSSION
The assignment of two aircraft to alert status is
consistent with existing operational procedures at P-3
overseas deployment sites. That is, the alert mission used
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in this model exists in reality to provide ready aircraft
for ASW, SAR, and surveillance missions, as well as for
quick-load weapons-carrying missions, which in the future
would include Harpoon. Since these ready-alert aircraft
receive complete pref light checks daily, it is a rare event
that either of them would be in a HACLS failed status.
Since the P->3 operational commander requires fully operational
aircraft for the alert role, once a failure in any system is
detected during an alert aircraft pref light, either the
failure is isolated and the faulty component replaced, or a
fully up aircraft is substituted for the faulty one. In
this model, the latter worst-case situation is assumed when
a HACLS fails.
The criterion for determining the number of successful
alert launches for the calculation of availability using
equation 2 is considered a workable one since, over the
approximately 1601 replications of alert launches, the HSTAT
of the third aircraft in the alert strike force would be
representative of a typical nonalert aircraft. Thus, it
would provide a reasonable sample for availability determi-
nation. This contention is borne out when one compares
this value of A . with A.
est
Concerning the scheduling of the end of HACLS maintenance
event, it is felt that, because the weapon replaceable
assemblies (WRAs) are intended to be removed and replaced
immediately upon detection of a failure, a worst-case analysis
model would consider that replacement spares are not
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immediately available. Alternatively, one could consider
that the failure is not immediately isolated and therefore
prompt HACLS repair by WRA replacement is not feasible.
Nonetheless, this simulation labels each failed WRA with
its respective aircraft identification number and, depending
upon the Navy Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) test
bench availability, the WRA is placed on the bench for repair
or is placed in a maintenance queue. This model assumes that
only one IMA test bench is available to service all WRAs.
Moreover, although more than one type of WRA exists in
reality, WRAs are assumed to be indistinguishable; thus, the
worst-case nature of this model is accentuated.
In effect this model and the analytical one give no
supply support to the squadron, a seemingly unrealistic
state of nature. Nevertheless, since HACLS is not presently
installed in operational squadron aircraft, the time to
repair probability distribution is unknown, Therefore,
because a distribution has to be assumed in any case, the
supply lag-time, if any, is aggregated with the maintenance
time to repair. By considering maintenance to repair
distribution as containing times to replace faulty components,
as well as the time awaiting parts not readily available
from the supply system, one can see that realism is preserved.
An estimate of the cost of computer facilities used to
develop the computer simulation model is $1066. Estimated




So far, the discussion has concerned itself with point
availability, the probability that a randomly selected HACLS
is up at a random point in time, The interval availability,
on the other hand, is defined as the expected fraction of a
given interval of time that a system will be able to operate
within its design tolerances [3] , The symbol A* will be
used to denote interval availability,
A* = A exp(-A* K t), (5)
where
A = point availability determined from the analytical
model
;
X* = the failure rate vector, for HACLS under its
critical mission operating environment (eg, strike
flight);
and
t = the vector of time in each HACLS mode.
Assumptions needed for equation 5 are: (i) No start-up
shock effect when HACLS shifts from one mode of operation to
another. (ii) Adverse effects associated with one HACLS
operation mode are independent of those existing in a
subsequent mode.
For a critical mission of 10 hours, for example, with
HACLS in the non-operating flight mode for 1.98 hours, BIT
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mode for 0.02 hour, and standby flight mode for one hour,
the A*' vector would be (0.1. 6,0, 5.0) A and t f is
J-i
(1.98, 0,02, 8,0), Given an availability, A, of 0.975, for
example,
A* = 0,975 exp(r-A*'t) = 0,933.
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VII. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Given the MDAC-E reliability figures for laboratory
failure rate, A T ; maintenance time to repair, U, assumed to
Ju
be exponential, with a mean of 24 hours; and the P-3
environmental k-f actors, listed in Table I; the analytical
model yields an A of 0,998 for the base case of one HACLS
flight per week, and maintenance efficiency, a, of 0,8, The
simulation, on the other hand, results in an asymptotic
availability of 0.997, with the same initial parameter
values. Equation 3 provides A = 0,998 to favorably compare
with these results. The analytical model gives a tt
1
of
0.949, the probability that HACLS is up at the beginning of
an operating period, A and A from the simulation equal
0,988.
In order to test sensitivity of the model to changes in
reliability, R, the operational scenario may be varied using
the T matrix shown in Table VI, Although this variation
presumes much greater HACLS utilization in the simulation,
it is considered for two reasons: i) to check the responsive-
ness of the model to an increased number of severe HACLS
operating environments, and ii) to determine the effect of
daily checks of HACLS on its point availability.
Variations in mean time to repair, y, yield the results



















13.5 10 0.48 0.02
13.5 10 0,48 0,02
20.5 3 0,48 0.02
20.5 3 0,48 0,02




Entries are the number of hours by mission category that
HACLS is in the various operating modes.
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insensitive to maintenance distribution, but is, of course,
sensitive to mean time repair t
Maintenance efficiency, a, increased beyond 0,8 does not
appreciably increase availability, as shown in figure 10,
However, availability at a = 0,5 is significantly below that
of a = 0,8, the base efficiency.
The analytical model is exercised with variations in
the number of HACLS flights per week, and the combined
results are shown in Table VII, Results for A-6, P<-3, and
S-3A squadrons are summarized in Table VIII, It is clear
from the above discussion that the semi^-Markov model appears
to be robust for non-exponential (non-Markovian ) cases
examined empirically.
On the basis of available numbers of aircraft by type,
the total number of failures per year are [11]




Total (888 A/C) 373 651
Assuming the below listed percentages of failures for
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PROOF OF THE THEOREM,
Since A exists, then for any e > 0, there exists
a t such that A - e ^ A(t) «< A + £ when t > t ,
Also, for t > t
,








(A-e)ds< / A(s)ds^ / A(s)ds+ / (A+£)ds
Jo Jt















A-e ,< lim i fLIB, — /
t^°° t /
A(.s)ds ^ A + e
Since e is arbitrary, let e -*- 0, Then,



























78840 is the number of aircraft
hours in one year of P-3 squadron


















70Sn = k = 0.0417678840 avg
1 FLIGHT PER WEEK
78840 - 12514 = 66326
52x24+313x30 = 10638
52x3(1. 98)+313(2)(l. 98) = 1548.4
52x3(0. 02)+313(2)(0. 02) = 15.64
52 x 5.98 +0 = 310.96

















2 FLIGHTS PER WEEK t k kt
78840 - 12618 = 66222 ,01 662.22
104x24+261x30 = 10326 .1 1032.6
104x3(1. 98)+261(2)(l. 98) = 1651,32 1 1651,32
104x3(0.02)+261(2)(,02) = 16,68 6 100.08
104 x 5.98 = 621,92 5 3109.6
104 x 0.02 = 2,08 6 12,48
k = 0.0832
avg
6 FLIGHTS PER WEEK
78840 - 12246 = 66594 ,01 665.94
52x30+313x24 = 9072 ,1 907.2
52x2(1. 98) +313x3 (1.98) = 2065,1 1 2065.1
52x2(0. 02 )+313x3( 0.02) = 20,86 6 125.16
52 x + 313 x (5.98) = 1081,7 5 5408.7
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The entries in P. are calculated as follows.A





Pr[Y.=l X.=l,0.=u]= TXT7- + TZiT- e1 'i ' l A+l/y A+l/y
and
Pr[Y.=l|X.=l]= r^j-; + t^TT- 0(X +l/y)l ' l A+l/y A+l/y v K '
since, letting 0(t) = Pr[0. ^ t]
,





= gO(u) I +h / e^U dO(u)
'0 Jo










l ' l '
Pr[Y.=3|X.=l] = j$^k [l+0(X+l/y)],























= i^7n + PPTTir °^+1/w).
The entries in PR are calculated in a similar way.






















=3] = j^_ [I(A)-I(l/y)],
t.-3] = a i+ mp£ - umA
= l-I(l/y)- i^TAtKA)-I(l/y)],
and




1. Air Force Logistics Command, Operations Analysis Report
Number 8, Project ABLE , by Irving Katz, May, 1969,
i
2. Logistics Management Institute, Criteria for Evaluating
Weapon System Reliability, Availability and Costs,
March, 1974.
3. Barlow, R.E. and Proschan, F,, Statistical Theory of
Reliability
,
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc,,
1975.
4. McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company-East, Memo
WSD^2372, "Ship and Submarine Launched Harpoon CLS
Availability Model," 2 May 1974.
5. Thompson, M., "Lower Confidence Limits and a Test of
Hypothesis for System Availability," IEEE
Transactions on Reliability, no. 1, pp. 32-36,
May, 1966.








8. Pristsker, A.A.B., The GASP IV Simulation Language
,
Wiley, New York, 1974.
9. Pritsker, A.A.B,, The GASP IV Users Manual, Pritsker &
Associates, Inc,, West Lafayette, Indiana.
10. McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company-East, Technical
Report number 561-E245-1680 , Harpoon P-3C HACLS
Availability Model
,
by J,L. Moon, 20 December, 1974.
11. McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company-East, Memo WSD-1897,
"Expected Annual HACLS Failures for all Aircraft
Platforms," 24 January 1974.
12. McDonnel-Douglas Astronautics Company-East, Memo WSD-2055
,





1, Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3, Department Chairman, Code 55 1




4. Professor G. G. Brown, Code 55 Zr 1




5. Professor J, D. Esary, Code 55 Eg 1




6. Professor K. T. Marshall, Code 55 Mt 1




7, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 1
Washington, D. C. 20361
Attention: CDR D. W. Stubbs, 5109 E
LCDR Tom McLaughlin
PMA-258-3 Logistics
8, McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company-East 1
P.O, Box 516
St. Louis, Missouri 63166
Attention; W.H, Roschke
Dept, E 245
Bldg. 107 Level 3
72



























launch system avai 1-
abi 1 i ty model
.
thesM728
Harpoon missile airborne command and lau
3 2768 001 01239 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
